The ontology of innovation : Human agency in the pursuit of novelty by Courvisanos, Jerry
The Ontology of Innovation:  
Human Agency in the Pursuit of Novelty 
___________________ 
Jerry Courvisanos* 
__________________ 
 
Abstract:        This paper develops an analysis of innovation based on Allen 
Oakley’s (2002) primary themes of ontological priority, agency-structure and 
critical realism. I develop a history of thought and contemporaneous endogenous 
view of innovation in an environment of uncertainty, potential novelty and policy 
priority. Drawing on the literature of Austrian, institutional, Schumpeterian, 
Penrosean and other schools, I explore a continuum of agency-structure 
relationships that enhance innovation. These relationships cover environments that 
are based on agency and contingency, through to those that balance contingency 
with containment (structure), and situations that are heavily contained. The 
literature on innovation is investigated vis-à-vis the degree to which different 
environments encourage creative, original marketable opportunities in the common 
good. Innovation policy-making is then investigated through the traverse process of 
irreversibility, and within a retroductionist planning process. Overall, I seek to 
advance the cause of realism through innovations generated in different 
environments. 
 
 
1          The Research Problem 
 
Ontology is often overlooked in the study and explication of innovation. Does this 
matter? It matters because ‘innovation’ has become an important word in the 
twenty-first century, reflecting all that is modern, progressive and exciting in a 
complex world. This is reflected in every phase of daily existence in modern 
capitalist economies. Firms are urged to be innovative to gain or sustain a 
‘competitive edge’; consultants advertise their strategic advice as the essence of 
innovation; the survival of local schools depends on the capacity building that 
comes from innovation; schools are exalted to have innovation in their curriculum; 
and universities promote themselves as leaders in innovation. Politicians respond to 
the need to support all of the above through policies to enhance national innovation. 
Ontology is ‘…the study (or a theory) of being or existence, a concern 
with the nature and structure of the “stuff” of reality’ (Lawson 2003, p. 12). Any 
study or research has a metaphysical precondition to modelling and empirical 
validation, whether implicitly or explicitly stated, and this is its ontology. Thus 
ontology is the foundation of all inquiry. Ontology illuminates the range of 
empirical phenomena that potentially can be investigated. When it comes to 
innovation, ontology is poorly conceived or implicitly assumed in an extremely 
simplistic approach. The reason is that the human actions underlying innovation 
have rarely been explicated in any clear, consistent manner.  
Innovation as a process is complex and poorly understood, because it is 
deeply rooted in the uncertainty of the future world, from which emerge new 
products, processes, movements, organisations and sources of raw material.1 All 
that is known is that innovation brings change and something ‘new’ emerges, which 
cannot be modelled (or only very sketchily modelled). As a result, it is often 
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portrayed as exogenous, and thus anything that cannot be accounted for by 
quantifiable measures is called ‘the residual’ and comes about via innovation. 
Empirical studies from as far back as Denison (1962) clearly show that this 
‘innovation’ residual is very significant, accounting for far more than 50 per cent of 
economic growth. Economic historians have confirmed the crucial role of 
innovation in their empirical narratives.2 
The research problem that emerges is how to identify and exposit a realist 
and sustainable theory of human action in the innovation process. Orthodox 
economics conceptualises a general ontology of the economic agent that is based on 
human action, to which innovation is only one specific application. The results of 
this approach have been inadequate. The next section identifies these inadequacies 
within the history of economic thought and argues for an ontology that places 
innovation and the pursuit of novelty at the centre of human agency. This can form 
the basis of an endogenous model of innovation and its significant impact on the 
analysis of economic development. Allen Oakley’s extensive work on the problem 
of human agency is briefly outlined with a view to using his theorising as the basis 
for a realist ontology of innovation. Then, novelty in human agency is specifically 
addressed, using heterodox economic thought and contributions from a number of 
innovation-based studies. A human agency path of innovation is specified and then 
used in a policy-planning framework applied to the traverse (or structural change 
path). 
 
2           Inadequate Orthodox Ontology of Innovation 
The mainstream economic view of human action is based on the ontological theory 
of ‘rational economic man’ (or homo oeconomicus). This is the deductivist-logic of 
an isolated human agent applying optimal economic rational decision-making 
calculations to all commercial decisions. The representative rational economic agent 
has the capacity to make all the information processing and computational 
calculations that are required to optimise any choice alternative faced in terms of 
accounting and opportunity costs. The aggregation of these representative agents 
produces optimal equilibrium outcomes. There have been many critiques of this 
economic agent from two perspectives. One is that such calculations require 
superhuman powers in assessing all the costs and benefits involved, and then 
projecting these into the unknowable future (e.g. Simon 1975). This results in 
fundamental uncertainty that cannot be reduced to some probabilistic distribution 
(see Lawson 1988). The other set of critiques focuses on the way this agent is 
effectively an abstraction, without real-world content, whose behaviour conforms to 
the idealised world of ‘free-to-choose’ capitalism (e.g., Lawson 1997; Boland 
1997).3 
From the innovation management viewpoint, this orthodox view of human 
agency has produced what John Legge and Kevin Hindle (2004, p. 25) call an 
‘ignorance’ of the ‘entrepreneur’ who brings forth innovation. Here, the general 
equilibrium approach ‘considers the “state of the world” long after the last 
innovation has taken place and no further changes can be expected.’ In essence, 
entrepreneurs in a perfectly competitive economy have no economic incentive to 
innovate when knowledge is instantaneously transmitted. Innovation ends up being 
exogenous in the orthodox economic model and, thus, resolves two problems. It 
overcomes the inability of human agents to predict the future and it ensures 
consistency of the general equilibrium model. However, this orthodox model 
sacrifices any claim to analyse innovation within capitalism, including the 
institutions of business management and socioeconomic development. 
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Legge and Hindle (2004) identify two main attempts to re-introduce 
innovation into orthodox theory. Firstly, at the microeconomic level, principal-
agent theory is scrutinised in the economics of management literature (e.g. Brickley 
et al 1997). Here the principals are shareholders (represented by the company 
board) who set up an organisational structure to ensure that their wishes are carried 
out by hired managers. This brings the entrepreneur ‘owner-shareholder’ into direct 
relation to the original entrepreneur ‘owner-manager’, both acting as the innovative 
spur for ‘the firm’. Legally, a limited liability company is different from its owners 
(Kay and Silberston, 1995, p.88); and empirically, corporate firms have been 
measured in terms of coordinating and combining core competencies as a 
cooperative process in tune with market reality (Acs and Audretsch 1991). Both 
aspects undermine the principal-agent theory, as shareholders lack any significant 
agency role, with corporate managers effectively making the decisions and the 
board merely rubber-stamping them. 
Two other orthodox microeconomic approaches to human agency, 
including norm-guided behaviour by mental models (e.g. North, 1981) and 
asymmetric market information (e.g. Stiglitz, 1987), identify sub-optimal outcomes 
through methodological individualism. Both advance ‘the claim that structure is 
entirely the result of individual actions’ (McKenna and Zannoni 2003, p. 2). 
Fundamental uncertainty and reduction of institutions to the impact of individual 
agent behaviour, raises further concerns for the ontology of innovation. Neither 
approach allows for any endogenous role that innovation can play in the dynamic 
mutual interdependence of institutions and agents. The innovation research problem 
is not resolved by these two approaches. Despite their more realist position, as 
recognised by Geoffrey Hodgson (2004, pp. 395 and 426), it remains the case that 
institutions are reduced to the autonomous actions of individuals. Such a path 
ignores the organisational origins of innovation and the role of the ‘social 
individual’ (Davis, 2003), limiting innovation to a peripheral role in market 
capitalism. 
Secondly, at the macroeconomic level, new growth theory relaxes the 
standard model by focusing on the cost and dissemination of new knowledge or 
innovation (Romer 1994). Only part of new knowledge is appropriated internally in 
the firm, while the rest spills over into the community to be appropriated by other 
entrepreneurs. Legge and Hindle (2004, p.32) describe the results as ‘unexceptional’ 
and consistent with the pioneering work of Smith (1776). New growth theory 
includes no explicit account of how knowledge is attained. Its realist credentials are 
thus lacking, since it ignores the endogenous generation of knowledge, with 
fundamental uncertainty and the representative agent problem both remaining.  
 
3          The Problem of Human Agency: The Oakley Contribution 
Allen Oakley has devoted much of the latter part of his scholarly career unpacking 
the problem of human agency within the study of economics; from the classical 
writers through to the Austrians (old and new) and to the neoclassical mainstream. 
In Oakley (2002), the project extends to devising a humanist reality of economic 
agency as a foundation for a reconstructed economic theory. The first principle
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 Oakley asserts is that empirical research has to be based on some ontology 
(explicitly or implicitly); otherwise one cannot identify what a researcher focuses on 
when examining the complex data of human activity. The second principle is that 
this ontological base needs to be grounded in a realist perspective of human activity 
in which actions are determined by the structured situations actually existing, which 
also affect this very same structure (Oakley 2002, pp. 18-20). For Oakley the 
problem of human agency in economics stems from orthodox economics rejecting 
the second principle by adopting a positivist (or physical scientistic methodological) 
view of autonomous existence and inherent orderliness that denies any role for real-
world agents in an open system. This results in the orthodox constructing complex 
methods of interpreting data on the implicit acceptance of this very simplistic and 
normative abstract ontology. 
The Oakley contribution is to represent human agents as they have been 
perceived by philosophers working on the anthropology of social activity, and then 
to situate such human actions within the economic phenomena of capitalism. This 
provides the basis for a realist economic ontology and consequently a more 
appropriate empirical methodology upon which to develop an economic theory.  
The richness of Oakley’s contribution to this enquiry cannot be adequately 
summarised, and any brief overview will inevitably be a caricature of the thesis he 
expounds. What follows are merely some crucial elements of Oakley’s thesis that 
form the basis for the ontology of innovation to be constructed in the next few 
sections. 
There needs to be, in Oakley’s view, a defensible ontology that can 
explicate human nature within an economic cosmos. The irreducible aspect of 
human agency in the economic sphere is centred on choices, decision-making and 
actions. A satisfactory ontology needs to capture the voluntaristic role of 
independent human agents in these three aspects of the economic sphere, but also 
recognise the deterministic social structure that governs all economic phenomena. 
This is the position developed by the critical realism literature led by Lawson (1997, 
2003). Oakley builds on the critical realism account by introducing a rich vein of 
philosophic writings by major social theorists, including Alfred Schutz, Karl 
Popper, Herbert Simon and Anthony Giddens. The following extract encompasses 
the dualistic relation between voluntarism and determinism: 
This social and economic cosmos is the unintended collective product of 
their individual actions immanently and volitionally guided by the 
situationally imposed rules, facilities and constraints that shape these 
actions. … But because of uncertainty and the need to depend upon 
other people within their social environment, the deliberated actions of 
individuals will for the most part generate phenomena that include 
outcomes that were not wholly expected and not wholly desired. 
(Oakley 2002, p. 192)  
The way that this dualistic relation operates within Oakley’s thesis, is that 
human agents search for a balance between the contingency of human action and 
containment that limits this human action. Contingency is a ‘free-to-choose’ agency 
concept that is strongly qualified by what agents know (or have learnt) based on 
their cumulative biography. Individual capacities emerge from this learnt past. In 
this concept, history matters in a very personal way and can be linked to Michal 
Kalecki’s economic growth dynamics, where the long-run is merely the cumulation 
of a chain of short-period decisions and actions.4 Thus, there is no long-run 
optimality in a realist account of history; instead there is a series of short-period 
events that cumulate as a chronicle into an ever-changing long-run dynamic.  
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Choice in such a dynamic is contingent on the past and backtracking is impossible,5 
which results in irreversible change. 
Containment is what Oakley calls the ‘situational conditioning of human 
agency’. Agent’s decisions and actions are conditional on the extant information, 
available facilities and imposed rules (or conventions) that particular societies 
develop and implement. This is the institutional framework of society that arises out 
of the situational conditioning. As social beings, human agents learn that it is in 
their best interests to co-operate by habits and routines with the institutional 
manifestations of the collective society. This containment of ‘the free spirit’ has two 
important implications. One is the recursive (or feedback) effect in which the 
endogenous cumulative biography of individuals both shape and are shaped by the 
institutional constraints learnt (or understood). The path of economic development 
and transformation is ‘locked-in’ on the basis of this recursive effect. The other 
implication is that society is prevented from disintegration into anarchy by 
institutional containment and reasoned agent behaviour in the face of these 
containments (we generally drive on one accepted side of the road). This is the 
‘complexity’ concept of an open system in which ‘…the collective behaviour of 
many basic but interacting units’ evolves over time, with self-organisation and 
adaptation (Coveney and Highfield 1995, p. 7). 
If society is totally contained by its institutional manifestations, without 
any room to move outside the given information, facilities and rules, then society is 
in a closed system like a chess game where all the rules are structured and 
unchangeable. Human action would then be limited to whatever can be created 
within these highly structured limitations. Anarchy occurs if, on the other hand, 
there is no containment of rules and structures. A completely open system emerges 
as with children playing their own developed games where the rules are changed in 
an ad hoc fashion as these games progress in a highly creative way.6 Economic 
phenomena rest on situations that exist between these two extremes. 
Oakley argues that it is the relative weighting of the balance between 
contingency and containment in any specific real-world setting that explicates the 
sources of human agency and determines its nature. If the weight of containment is 
greater than contingency, then the system favours generalisability based on strict 
logical arguments. If the weight of containment is less than contingency, then the 
system favours less generalisability and leads to more complexity-based arguments 
that, overall, create and dissolve patterns over time. The crucial issue for Oakley is 
to capture the right balance between contingency and containment in any particular 
phenomenon under investigation (Oakley 2002, p. 216). In the discussion below, 
this question of balance between contingency and containment is referred to as 
‘C&C’.7 
From this ontological basis, Oakley identifies three research enquiries in 
economics. The first is to ‘… seek out any ontologically occurring regularities and 
universalities that characterize the generation of a particular type of phenomenon.’ 
For example, by identifying patterns of behaviour in investment cycles that drive 
booms and busts (see Courvisanos 1996). The second enquiry is ‘…to supply the 
regularity and universality that scientific inquiry demands’ where such 
characteristics are not found. This requires much deeper research insights which can 
be ascertained from complexity-type computer modelling (see Courvisanos and 
Richardson 2006). Finally, in the third enquiry the researcher needs ‘…to design
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interventions that maximize the containment and minimize the contingent remainder 
affecting agents’ deliberations and decisions’ (Oakley 2002, pp. 215-7, all three 
quotes above). This latter enquiry is referred to as praxis, where change comes from 
understanding how processes work. Policy design strategies should aim to allow 
agents volitionally to be directed and contained towards desired outcomes; 
otherwise the policy changes would not be sustainable. Any attempt by agents to 
maximise contingency leads to anarchy. Oakley therefore argues that the rules need 
to be set by which agents abide. This is particular the case for crucial issues like the 
ecosystem, where contingency must be constrained from the start in framing policy. 
By combining this three-pronged research agenda with previous work on 
Adolph Lowe (Oakley, 1987 and 1994), a traverse (or structural change path) can be 
devised by working backwards from the desired end to the required means in a 
search procedure referred to as retroduction. Lowe uses this approach to make 
‘regressive inferences’ and so derive necessary links back to motivational patterns 
that can be successful in achieving the desired end.8 It is through Lowe’s traverse 
that the interaction of volition and constraints can transcend the C&C spectrum, as 
will be developed later in this discussion. 
 
4          Novelty as the Basis of Innovation 
 
Innovation can be defined as the creative application of knowledge to increase the 
set of techniques and products commercially available in the economy. The essence 
of the definition of innovation is novelty, in terms of creative ideas that are 
commercialised within the economic sphere of human activity. 
Faber et al. (1996, p.154) refer to economic genotypes as potentialities 
that allow for the emergence of novelty. In an economy, this genotype comprises: 
(a)  the preference orderings of agents ; (b)  a set of known techniques ;  and         
(c) institutions (legal, economic and social). Later in this discussion it will be shown 
how a traverse can be planned to achieve certain outcomes for the common good 
(e.g. ecologically-based sustainable development that incorporates a drastic 
reduction of greenhouse gases) by using the above genotype structure. Essentially 
this needs a process by which containment through the use of the existing 
institutions can induce particular contingency preference ordering that will result in 
a specific set of techniques that are consistent with the common good. The 
economic phenotypes, based around investment and consumption within a market 
structure, will then be able to realise such potential as ecological sustainability. 
The forms innovation can take, in order of their impact on economic 
development (from low to high), are:  (i) continuous (or ‘Kaizen’) occurring daily at 
the workplace; (ii)  incremental, based on research and development (R&D);  (iii) 
radical discontinuous based on entrepreneurship (both corporate and 
individual/team); (iv) technological systems change, based on a cluster of 
innovations; and (v)  techno-economic paradigm shift due to major structural 
change (e.g. the steam engine and information technology). Each form of innovation 
can dovetail into higher order innovation, thus becoming increasingly more 
important to society.  
At the ontological level, why do human agents carry out innovation? 
Various orthodox exogenous explanations identified in the previous section are 
essentially ‘manna from heaven’ and fail on the realist ontology framework. Non-
mainstream (or heterodox) economic paradigms are developing alternative 
perspectives to rational economic man, but they all ‘…work with different strategies 
for explaining agency’ (Davis 1999, p.464). In his effort to develop a heterodox 
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theory of individual action, Davis (2003) notes that current diverse and arbitrary 
heterodox explanations lack coherence. A realist ontological story can emerge from 
these diverse views that can be the basis for understanding the concept of 
endogenous innovation. 
Outside the economics discipline there are a number of innovation-based 
sets of literature that provide insights into human agency which specifically 
contextualises innovation. All the professional literature has useful insights without 
providing an ontological foundation to innovative behaviour.9 There is an implied 
homo oeconomicus assumption in the business professions coming from its roots in 
orthodox microeconomics, with the uncertainty and representative agent dilemmas 
remaining intact. Despite this, the strong empirical basis of their research provides a 
rich source of data that can inform a realist ontology of innovation.   
Oakley opened his own investigation of human agency by stating that 
‘…it is this capacity [of agents] for dealing with novelty that is most relevant.’ 
(Oakley 2002, p. 31, fn3). This section aims to look directly at novelty as the basis 
for innovation in theorising a sustainable endogenous ontology of innovation using 
both heterodox and the professional innovation-based literature. Oakley (2002, p.31, 
fn. 4) notes that  ‘… the agents and strategic actions in focus … are confronted with 
the problem of adapting habits and routines in order to make decisions in the face of 
novel situations.’10 Only the successful adoption of the new routines can lead to the 
wide diffusion of innovation. Novelty brings into play the balance between C&C. 
Using C&C, a spectrum can be identified that encapsulates all forms of 
innovation. At one end of the spectrum is the entrepreneurship literature that 
espouses spontaneous responses to economic and social conditions in the way 
contingency far outweighs containment, resulting in radical innovation (or 
significantly different incremental innovation). Human actions by agents at this end 
are strongly influenced by what John Maynard Keynes (1936, p. 137) calls ‘animal 
spirits’ in an environment where containment is relatively weak. Society encourages 
the ‘spontaneous urge to action’ (ibid., p. 144) of entrepreneurs. At the other end of 
the spectrum is the technology management and organisational behaviour literatures 
that espouse key management practices (or rules and conventions) to economic and 
social conditions in the way containment far outweighs contingency, resulting in 
continuous and incremental innovation. Human actions by agents at this end are 
strongly constrained by history, with the individual and institutional biographies 
derived from the past, but still within what Keynes called ‘the entrepreneur 
economy’ in which ‘entrepreneurs’ are compelled to make investment decisions 
(ibid., p. 150).11 Complexity allows the arbitrary typology of this simple C&C 
spectrum to be used in any real-world situation. For example, an initially 
constrained innovation can, over time, shift to the spontaneous end of the spectrum 
as society and its participants in entrepreneurial decision-making become more open 
in the systems employed.  
Two major contributions are identified and examined in Oakley (2002) to 
the concept of novelty. These contributions by Young Back Choi and George 
Shackle can be grafted onto the C&C spectrum to derive an ontology of innovation. 
Choi (1993) recognises uncertainty as the stimulus for innovation.12 Opportunities 
arise with the uncertainties of life (‘disequilibria’ in orthodox economics). Choi 
identifies the sources of these uncertainties as: (i) ontological complexities, (ii) 
unpredictability of the future, (iii) interdependence between agent and others, and 
(iv) limitations of the mental capacities of agents.13 With such difficulties, any 
situation in which agents need to make a decision and act into the future requires a 
set of guidelines provided by a ‘repertoire’ of habits and routines established from 
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the past. Choi calls these ‘paradigms’ that have evolved from experience. The more 
novel the situation, the more agents need to search for the most appropriate 
paradigm and then modify it to best address this situation. Innovation comes out of 
this process. This ‘search and modify’ behaviour can fit into the C&C spectrum by 
recognising the extent of contingency and containment in each decision. The more a 
paradigm is modified, the closer the agent is on the spontaneous end of the C&C 
spectrum. 
The deeper ontological question that Choi’s analysis brings forth is how 
‘search and modify’ behaviour operates in a world of fundamental uncertainty to 
produce innovation. This behaviour cannot be based on any calculation of what is 
objectively probable, but instead on the subjectivity of what is deemed possible. 
This is the starting point for Shackle to explore the role of imagination in this 
‘search and modify’ agency process. Shackle has published a significant body of 
work on the role of imagination, driven by inspiration, as the source of creative 
solutions (or simply, ideas) to the problem of fundamental uncertainty when it 
comes to making decisions into the future and acting on them. In the process of 
devising such inspirational solutions, novelty and innovation are introduced into the 
system. From this proposition, it is clear why the ‘… world in which enterprise is 
necessary and possible is a world of uncertainty’ (Shackle 1967, p. 133). As Oakley 
(2002, p. 111) notes: “For Shackle, the very existence of profit as capitalism’s 
raison d’être stems from uncertainty manifested in expectations of value”, where 
‘… the differences between the value of a current stock of goods and their expected 
future value … [are] subjectively assessed by the holding agent.’ 
Placing future time into a reasoned rational space through imagination, 
Shackle turns ‘mechanical man’ into ‘inspired man’, without giving up formalism. 
Shackle does this by identifying degrees of potential surprise that form a sequel in 
any contemplated course of decision and action. Oakley (2002) develops this 
account of Shackle’s work in three detailed chapters. What Shackle contributes is a 
subjective (yet formal) process of innovation by handling uncertainty through the 
imagination. Shackle’s weakness on the situational conditioning of agents 
(identified by Oakley) can be overcome by incorporating Choi’s paradigms within 
the C&C spectrum. This then provides a thorough ontological theoretical construct 
from which to understand innovation and its diffusion. 
For completeness, the diverse heterodox and professional contemporary 
literatures on innovation are briefly placed within this C&C construct. None of 
these sets of literatures establish any clear prior ontology that encapsulates the 
whole spectrum. Their own respective limited rationales situate innovation only on 
one part of the C&C spectrum.  
At the extreme spontaneous end of the C&C spectrum exists the neo-
Austrian literature (see Kirzner 1973), in which the entrepreneur is seen as alert to 
opportunities for taking advantage of discrepancies and gaps in the market  
system.14  In this sense, the neo-Austrian version of the entrepreneur is an 
arbitrager; a person embodying foresight, knowledge and willingness to act in 
situations of widespread ignorance of the disequilibria that exist (Canterbery 1995, 
p. 262). Exploiting opportunities in a rational planning manner adds to the value of 
the final product by the techniques that are ‘put to use’. The appropriation of 
monopoly power in the market is evidence of creative and successful 
entrepreneurship. Such monopoly power is not seen as permanent by neo-Austrians 
unless such power is underwritten, subsidised and otherwise supported by 
governments and their regulatory agencies. Shackle would feel comfortable within 
this body of literature, if not for him recognising that action of entrepreneurs must 
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be situated within a social, conditioning and regularising environment. The 
entrepreneurship business literature is based on the same human agency rationale, 
but at the implementation (‘how to do it’) level. Not surprising that the role of 
containment (especially government) is seen as part of the exogenous environment 
rather than situated inside the agency ontology.15    
At the other constrained extreme of the C&C spectrum exist the 
Institutional and neo-Schumpeterian literatures. Innovation in this approach comes 
from the ‘technostructure’ of the large corporations that form the planning system of 
capitalist economies and which guides economic development. This agency group 
embraces specialised knowledge, talent and experience (especially through R&D) in 
specific technology-based areas where the market system (and its small enterprises) 
is symbiotically subservient to the decisions of large corporations, while 
governments need to acquiesce to the planning system’s power and influence. This 
exemplifies a highly constrained innovation process. John Kenneth Galbraith (1967) 
developed this large firm dominance approach from Joseph Schumpeter (1942) with 
a managerial class that is concerned to protect and support increasingly 
sophisticated technology in a planned approach.16 Power lies with the 
technostructure that serves partly the capitalist-owners through share price and 
dividend sustainability, with increasingly generous serving to themselves via 
remuneration packages and perquisites of office.  
The mainstream business management literature is compatible with the 
Institutional approach, but with a microeconomic perspective of the firm as an 
administrative unit that develops a ‘life’ of its own and is not distinguished from the 
actors who operate inside this organisation. Edith Penrose (1959) is the major 
inspiration for this perspective.17 The focus is on the firm’s internal development 
through a dynamic capabilities framework. In this approach, it is human agency 
itself that gets sublimated under the co-ordination of core competencies. The human 
agency rationale at the management level remains essentially homo oeconomicus as 
explained above. At the level of the general employees in an organisation, Teresa 
Amabile (1988, p. 55) addresses the ability of workers to be creative by asserting: 
‘…do what you love and love what you do.’ This creativity comes from internal 
motivation to engage in rewarding and challenging work, which is cultivated 
through organisational creativity management. Locked-in to the containment end of 
C&C, agents’ ability to be creative and then take the innovation through to 
implementation. However, this can only be seen as exogenous, i.e. internal 
motivation comes from outside the research ‘model’. It follows that the problem 
with the management literature is its inability to endogenise useful observations    to 
capitalism’s raison d’être in matching expectations with time-bounded uncertainty.  
A new set of innovation literature based on the notion of the ‘Creative 
Class’ provides a more complex problem for the C&C ontological construct. The 
major theoretical and empirical work is based on Richard Florida (2002), who 
identifies innovation in the creativity of an elite class of talented individuals. The 
elite prefer places that are diverse, tolerant and open to new ideas. Such regions 
develop effective, speedy and concentrated flows of knowledge, which Florida calls 
‘creative capital’, as it is the prime asset in the region’s economic development. 
Entrepreneurship and business development are attracted by these elite. Regions 
throughout developed economies are promoting themselves as centres with a 
particular unique blend of creative capital, but its diffusion quickly dissipates over 
distance significantly limiting the spillover effects to nearby regions. The creative 
elite are at the spontaneous end of the C&C spectrum, and are attracted by a broad 
set of social and cultural conditions that reside within specific geographic 
 49
  History of Economics Review  50 
 
boundaries. This makes the creative elite highly contingent on what attracts them to 
the region, yet the elite themselves create the innovative environment. There is an 
ontological problem in having regional development authorities searching for and 
supporting this elite when it is this very elite that creates the appropriate 
environment. Regional policies based on attracting and retaining this elite need to 
develop a ‘containment’ environment that works against the elite’s own 
predilections and is exogenous to their own creativity. Also, the footloose nature of 
the elite implies that another region may find it easy to ‘poach’ such highly prized 
individuals.18  
Overall, the C&C spectrum provides a way of understanding innovation 
across the whole breadth of innovation forms. It also indicates the specific 
ontological limitations of various approaches to innovation proffered by scholars 
from different research disciplines.19 The remaining sections of this paper examines 
how this ontological account of innovation can provide a sound basis for examining 
the endogenous paths of economic development that innovation has the potential to 
create. This development path accords with Oakley’s scholarly concern for Adolph 
Lowe’s political economics. 
 
5          The Human Agency Path through Innovation 
 
The move forward from the ontological exposition of innovation above to a realist 
human enquiry of various aspects of innovation identified in the diverse sets          
of innovation literatures requires the human agency path to be revealed. Oakley 
(2002, pp. 6-7) explains that ‘… full appreciation of the reality around us requires 
us to adopt a “three-level” perspective on how it is structured and grasped.’20 This 
section adopts Oakley’s three levels, namely mental approach, procedural 
rationality and situational analysis, to appreciate the structure of the human agency 
path of innovation and progress through it.   
The path begins where human action is ‘…conceived of as a self-
conscious, subjective and cognitive being.’ (Oakley 2002, p. 9) The realist ontology 
specified earlier rejects the homo oeconomicus instrumentalist psychology. In its 
place Oakley substitutes ‘folk psychology’ of thoughts shaped by agents’ mental 
makeup.21 It is here that ideas are formulated. For innovation, at the cognitive level 
there are specific mental qualities, dispositions, intentions and purposes that are 
reflected in the characteristics of entrepreneurship discussed earlier. Out of the 
‘endless list’ that can be made up of these characteristics, Michael Schaper and 
Thierry Volery (2004, p. 36) identify three valid traits: (i) need for achievement, (ii) 
internal locus of control22 and (iii) risk-taking propensity. These traits are inevitably 
subjective and can never be reduced to objective elements of the physical sciences 
type. The three traits provide the pre-existing cognitive qualities that allow sensory 
data to be processed so that opportunities for innovation can be identified. For 
Oakley (1994, fn 19), this ‘…demands a significant degree of creativity and 
independent insight on the part of the agent, as well as a deep knowledge of existing 
and potential future production techniques and/or product outputs.’ Agents with a 
strong concentration of the three traits develop a strategic sequence of proposed 
actions that are resource-using while incurring both sunk and transaction costs. 
Examples of such ex ante decisions and actions in the innovation field are R&D, 
education and training, technological management, new product marketing, and, 
crucially, investment in new capital goods. 
At the second level, the omnipotent optimising (substantive) rationality of 
homo oeconomicus is replaced by procedural rationality. Allessandro Vercelli 
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(1998) argues cogently from first principles that fundamental uncertainty makes any 
optimisation algorithm based on substantive rationality impossible to express in any 
way that would have operational significance. The elements of irreversibility and 
complexity that arise over historical time imply that an adaptive procedural 
rationality is required.23 This means that creativity and innovation can only be 
achieved in a cumulative process of learning by doing and acquiring knowledge 
through implementation of acceptable adaptive (non-optimal) conventions and 
rules. The crucial aspect of this rationality is that innovation is a contingent process 
that achieves outcomes ‘… that cannot fully realize any imposed notion of an 
optimum’ (Oakley 2002, p. 168). Innovation is a risk related to changing a product, 
process or organisation (or introducing a new movement or opening up a new raw 
material source), which is a matter of fundamental uncertainty and is different from 
the chance-type financial risk of capitalists when speculating, lending or 
gambling.24  
Situational analysis is the final perspective level that folds into the 
previous two levels. Here, the ‘free-to-choose’ market situation must be replaced 
with an in situ action process where autonomy is counter-balanced by contingent 
containment. Autonomous subjectivism of Austrian economics needs to be 
weighted up against Marxist determinism. In the innovation process, the 
opportunities and options that confront the entrepreneur are bounded by the folk 
psychology of the entrepreneur and the particular procedural steps she/he takes, as 
well as the actions of other agents in response to the same opportunities and the 
initial actions of the original entrepreneur. All this is bounded by the specific 
institutions and political frameworks that influence the development of any 
particular innovation.25 Often it is the second or third entrepreneur who follows the 
initial entrepreneur in the same innovation process that succeeds in the long-term 
diffusion of the innovation.26 Also, sometimes innovations (and creative ideas) 
appear independently of each other around the same time because the in situ is very 
similar, with the first two levels of this agency path being congruent.27 The above in 
situ circumstances narrow the possibilities from which innovation is ‘chosen’ and 
shapes the mentality of the participants in the innovation process and its diffusion. 
 
6          The Traverse in the Political Economics of Innovation 
 
Enhancement of innovation has become the quintessential feature of commercial, 
political economic and business life. However, the diverse views and applications of 
the term innovation have shown very little understanding of what innovation is all 
about and how best to enhance its processes for the common good. This section will 
take the ontological novelty-based human agency path of innovation as the 
fundamental sequential process (or traverse) and develop a coherent systems 
approach to innovation policy for public and private sectors within capitalism. The 
result is a comprehensive political economic intervention that enhances innovation 
systems within a particular geographical boundary that demarcates a domain which 
may be sub-national region, national, cross-country regional or even global (in 
terms of, for example, greenhouse emission protocols). 
The observed traverse is defined as a sequence of irreversible events 
within the structure of production. These events are changes that occur (or are 
induced by policy) to alter the level of demand or supply in the economy at a macro 
level. In response, these changes lead to a sequence of slowly evolving production 
decisions made by industries and firms. An innovation that changes the structure of 
production generates an observed traverse. This traverse requires empirical analysis 
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both from the perspective of the change agent’s behaviour involved and the 
strategies and processes that created the traverse path. Radical innovation is major 
change that alters significantly the traverse path. Incremental innovation is minor 
change that supports and enhances the current traverse path. 
Our realist ontological analysis shows that innovation does not come ‘out 
of thin air’. The previous section identified the complex in situ human agency path 
of innovation. Thus, innovation is contingent on this path, which includes the 
institutional and political frameworks of the specified geographical boundary under 
consideration. All innovations come out of a subjective contingency that is tractable 
in a complexity-type process. Intervention in the economics of innovation is highly 
commercial (e.g. Bill Gates monopolising information technology) and political 
(e.g., warfare needs for military technology). The task of the political economy of 
innovation is to devise policy-induced interventions that serve the broader 
community and not purely the interests of some powerful commercial interests and 
their political supporters. 
Adolph Lowe set himself the task to develop an instrumental traverse that 
is a policy-designed trajectory which is based on specific end-target goals. Lowe 
considered that these goals must be determined by grass roots support (voluntary 
conformity) and have the supporting systems and ‘instruments’ to deliver what is 
demand-determined. This strategy needs a carefully designed adjustment process 
with targets for each stage of the traverse to be supported by investment perspective 
planning as set out by Kalecki. This Lowe-Kalecki planning framework provides 
the instrumental policy approach for the political economics of innovation 
incorporating the three-level human agency perspective. This planning framework 
can transcend the C&C spectrum in a particular administrative region.  
Lowe(1976) established an instrumental analytical framework designed to 
enable rules of formal behavioural logic to be applied to economic cause and effect 
sequences over historical time. This framework is particularly aimed at using such 
cause-effect principles to communicate to agents concerned about the goal-directed 
outcomes desired. Agents who want to be involved in contingent entrepreneurial 
activity need to convert these ‘control design’ principles developed through 
innovation into behaviour and actions that ‘add-up’ to the desired macro-level 
outcomes. For Lowe, the patterns of conduct for innovative agents need to deliver a 
sustainable, equitable and ecologically supportive economic environment.28 Once 
the desired patterns have been identified, then it is critical to ensure communication 
and implementation requirements are accurate and effective. This approach directly 
addresses innovation through the contingent folk psychology in the human agency 
path. Thus, the ideas that will be generated through this economic genotype can be 
more conducive to desired patterns (e.g., ecological sustainability) rather than 
undesired patterns (e.g., speculative and predator activities like corruption, fraud 
and destruction of the ecosystem). 
Procedural rationality is needed to ‘handle’ fundamental uncertainty that 
inevitably will confront innovation in the future pattern of desired conduct. Analysis 
and evidence show that uncertainty through innovation by the short-term myopia of 
the ‘mistake-ridden private sector’ causes investment instability, thus undermining 
economic activity and competitive advantage (Courvisanos 1996, pp. 190-2).29 The 
private corporate investment strategy that is best suited to innovation needs a secure 
business environment, but one that has public policies which support continuous 
development and change (see Kay 1993). This situation potentially offers an 
opportunity (via containment) to influence agency-based innovation activities 
towards a sustainable outcome. In market-based economic regions or nations that 
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lack relevant supportive physical and social infrastructure, there is insufficient order 
and coherence (or containment) to impel the creation of innovative sustainable 
investment projects by the private sector without a state structural adjustment 
policy. 
In is possible to link Lowe’s planning framework with a specific strategy 
for investment, through Kalecki’s (1986) ‘perspective planning’ approach. This 
approach to investment planning establishes motivation and voluntary conformity 
directed towards appropriate goals (e.g. ecologically sustainable economic growth). 
A path of dynamic diffusion of new technological and organisational systems needs 
to be established that is conducive to innovation for a sustainable physical 
environment. This requires long-term investment strategies to have an incrementally 
adjusting perspective planning approach.30  
To achieve this perspective plan it is necessary to (a) establish specific 
practical short-term goals to (b) induce specific long-run sustainable rationality in 
contingency-based innovation with (c) investment decisions that generate specific 
long-term goals. The plan must be continually assessed at every short-term end-
point to see whether it is necessary to revise the goals and the strategy for reaching 
the broad-based long-term scenario. A perspective plan with these goals is set up to 
form a specific investment programme in consort with agreed human agency rules 
that deliver the type of sustainability determined by Lowe’s ‘instrumental analysis’. 
 
7          Conclusion 
 
Innovation is central to the study of economics, both in terms of behavioural 
processes and economic development. If there is no innovation, society stagnates. 
Scarce resources can only be distributed more effectively by innovation, both 
organisationally and technologically. Yet, innovation remains poorly analysed and 
even more poorly modelled in the economic ‘science’. Major economic thinkers 
have placed innovation at the centre of their analysis (e.g. Smith, Marx, 
Schumpeter), and others have seen innovation as an important long-run 
development (e.g. Hayek, Kalecki, Lowe). A view that innovation cannot be 
modelled because its processes are complex, uncertain and therefore indeterminate 
has dominated economics. Innovation can only be seen a posteriori, and this 
inductivity is unacceptable to economists who see their ‘positivist science’ as 
deductivist and objective. In effect, this approach accepts the current economic 
phenotype and merely attempts to optimise economic efficiency of such a realised 
economic system. 
This paper adopts the Oakley human agency analysis to show how a 
reconstruction of economic theory using a realist ontology can be applied to 
develop a model of innovation decision-making and action. Oakley models human 
action by capturing the balance between contingency and containment. This 
provides the basis for understanding the wide gamut of entrepreneurial activity that 
can be seen as innovation; from strongly contingent to heavily contained. A three-
level perspective of the human agency path (mental approach, procedural 
rationality, situational analysis) provides an approach to modelling an agent’s 
innovation process. Once this path is appreciated, then, Lowe’s instrumental 
analysis can be adopted to transcend the contingency/containment spectrum by 
seeking the co-operation of entrepreneurs and other agents in the path of innovation 
and its diffusion along generally accepted economic goals. This approach 
recognises the limitless potentialities of novelty within the economic genotype, and 
to use the institutional structures available to alter the preference ordering of 
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economic agents so that the imagination can be focused on innovations that can 
produce a set of techniques for acceptable goals like ecological sustainability. The 
Kaleckian perspective planning of investment can be used to support and guide this 
innovation strategy. With such a process model, the innovation issues and policy 
debates around what sort of society we want in the future becomes a realist 
ontological necessity. 
Economists need to see change agents as operating in a messy world of 
contingency and uncertainty in which agents use bounded rationality to satisfice 
behaviour in a complexity-based world. The science of complexity allows an 
investigation of innovation as an open system in which the collective behaviour of 
many basic but interacting units evolve over time, with self-organisation and 
adaptation.31 A formal process of innovation by handling uncertainty through the 
imagination allows economists not only to appreciate the novelty of innovation, but 
also to identify systemic failures. In this way, government intervention can be 
developed to induce entrepreneurial action in an equitable and effective manner. 
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Notes 
 
1  Kalecki (1954, p. 158) identifies such phenomena as making ‘…necessary new 
investment in productive and transportation facilities, etc.’, and as such, stimulates 
economic activity. 
2   For example, in chronological order, these include: Landes (1970), Rosenberg (1976), 
von Hippel (1988), Freeman and Soete (1997). Many more exist. Quite a few are listed and 
discussed in Freeman and Soete (1997). 
3    This fiction is represented by the identification in the business press of financial 
incentive as a return for uncertainty, when in fact it is a pure gambling exploit (see Strange, 
1986).  
4    The appropriate quote from Kalecki (1968, p. 263) is: ‘…the long-run trend is only a 
slowly changing component of a chain of short-period situations; it has no independent 
entity’. 
5    ‘I should have…’ is pointless, ‘I can learn from this…’ is a useful addition to a person’s 
biography. 
6    Both examples of chess (closed system) and children’s games (open system) are 
provided by Oakley (2002, p. 209).  
7  Oakley (2002) acknowledges the work of Anthony Giddens in identifying this C&C 
spectrum. 
8     For a detailed exposition, see Forstater (1999). 
9  Over the last fifteen years, the entrepreneurship discipline has developed much empirical 
research on the characteristics that make up an entrepreneur who introduces novelty into an 
economic activity. Despite this effort (and its reproduction ad nauseam in textbooks), 
Storey (2000, p. 137) comments that “…the identikit picture of the entrepreneur whose 
business is likely to grow is extremely fuzzy”.  The management of technological 
innovation literature has developed a long case study tradition in this aspect of strategic 
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innovation that is led by Chandler (1990) and more recently supporting this with 
quantitative measures of change (Ettlie, 2000). As professional guides to strategic 
management this literature has provided a powerful framework for technological 
commercialisation (see especially, Jolly 1998), but there is no ontological account of what 
drives this innovation. Organisational behaviour literature has argued strongly that 
innovation comes from engaging individuals in creative organisational climates that 
influence and support creativity, especially in terms of continuous innovation (Amabile 
1997). Establishing an environment (or climate) that employees love to work within 
provides support for creativity but does not explain the motivation for such creativity. 
10   Oakley (2002) does not investigate the notion of novelty itself. The aim of this paper is 
to use the C&C spectrum developed in Oakley (2002) to elucidate ontology of innovation 
by locating various writers on innovation across the C&C spectrum and then integrating this 
analysis to transcend any simplistic taxonomy of innovation-based writings. 
11  This C&C spectrum resolves the problem of using the term ‘entrepreneur’ in two 
distinct ways. The entrepreneurship literature assumes all entrepreneurs are on the 
spontaneous end of the spectrum, whereas the Post-Keynesian literature assumes all 
entrepreneurs make investment decisions in the creation of new plant and equipment from 
profits. Such investment decisions are implicated throughout the spectrum, with the nature 
of this investment reflecting the form of innovation undertaken (see Courvisanos 2003). 
12   This is in stark contrast to the ostensibly financial incentive (or greed) of homo 
oeconomicus, which has been ontologically rejected earlier in this discussion (see Note 3).  
13      Adapted from Oakley (2002, p.31, fn3). 
14     Consistent with this view is Schumpeter’s first analysis in 1911. He identified the 
entrepreneurial process in terms of the small capitalist who drives new ideas into the market 
place while destroying old products and processes (“creative destruction”, Schumpeter 
1934), and this seemed to be consistent with the form of capitalism observed by economists 
through the nineteenth Century. The innovative activity is seen to be exogenous to the firm 
(especially the characteristics of the entrepreneur), in what has been referred to as 
Schumpeter Mark I. 
15     As a result, the textbooks on entrepreneurship ignore totally the role of government 
and they play scant attention to the creativity environment that can nurture innovation (see 
for example, Kuratko and Hodgetts 2004). 
16    By the early 1940s, Schumpeter recognised the institutionalisation of R&D in  
sustaining the monopoly power of large corporations to the point that he was concerned that 
this process would see the end of the entrepreneur as R&D became a purely                
bureaucratic  activity (Schumpeter 1942).  This  raised  the  spectre  of  Schumpeter  Mark  
II 
 
 
with “creative accumulation” from minor incremental innovative activity that is endogenous 
to the large corporation. 
17    A significant contribution to this perspective by economists working in this field is 
Dosi et al. (2000). 
18   Empirical and policy critiques of this ‘Creative Class’ literature have been cogently 
developed. For an outline of these critiques see Rainnie (2005). 
19  This discussion examines only writers on novelty from the ontological criterion. For a 
broader examination of this work on novelty, taking account of methodological and 
metaphorical criterion, see Hodgson (1999, p. 135).  
20  Oakley (2002, p. 6) calls this ‘transcendental realism’. It is based on mechanisms of 
structure, rules and power that generate events and states of affairs. 
21   Oakley identifies Karl Popper at the self-identity mental level (Popper and Eccles 1977) 
and George Shackle at the economic actions level (Shackle, 1972) as major contributors to 
this concept of folk psychology. 
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22      In the entrepreneurship literature, this refers to the personal ability of the entrepreneur 
to take control of situations. 
23   Oakley identifies Herbert Simon as the major contributor to the concept of procedural 
rationality in many of his writings (see, for example, Simon 1976). 
24    On the specific procedural rational steps that need to be followed by an entrepreneur 
when conducting an innovation process, see Legge and Hindle (2004, pp. 161-88). 
25   For example, the innovation path of military technology is heavily circumscribed by the 
particular needs of warfare, from Spartan hoplite to US stealth bombers. Jones (1987) 
explains these processes. 
26   Legge and Hindle (2004, pp. 74-6) call this the ecological model of innovation, where 
an initial inventor or researcher “discovers” a logical relationship or a physical phenomenon 
that seems to have limited practical applications. The broader innovation applications are 
provided by the initial entrepreneur (or “intrapreneur” in a large corporation), but it is the 
other entrepreneurs who follow and diffuse the innovation who create the larger market 
possibilities. For example, Henry Ford’s Model T Ford introduced in 1908 was the start of 
the great technological thrust of mass-motor vehicle market, but it was General Motors and 
Alfred Sloan (and then many other motor vehicle companies with minor innovations) that 
made the motor vehicle ubiquitous. 
27  Some examples of simultaneous discoveries are food canning (Appert [France] and 
Donkin [Britain]), aluminium smelting (Hall [USA] and Héroult [France]), counter-cyclical 
government macroeconomic policy (Keynes [Britain], Kalecki [Poland] and 
Lundberg/Lindahl [Sweden]). 
28  See Courvisanos (2005) for a full account of this ecologically sustainable innovation 
policy framework. 
29   See also Richardson (1960) for details on lack of co-ordination in markets for 
investment and the systemic failures that this creates. Richardson goes on to specify how 
investment co-ordination through information agreements and industrial concentration can 
assist in developing micro-goals in policy-oriented strategies. 
30   Vercelli (1998, p. 274), in his conclusion, explains why long-term goals need to be 
established: 
One of the main reasons for the deterioration of environmental problems 
may be ascribed precisely to the myopia of economic agents increasingly 
obsessed by very short-run objectives. Short-run rationality produces a 
profound irrationality in the longer run. Only a broader long-run 
rationality may produce a process of sustainable development avoiding 
deep regrets. 
31   Courvisanos and Richardson (2006) show how unstable economies operate, not in a 
purely chaotic environment, but within a “corridor of viability” that limits instability.           
It is manipulation through containment that the corridor can direct contingency, inherent in 
instability, on a traverse path of sustainable rather that unsustainable development. 
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